Objectives: Neuroplastic changes that drive recovery of shoulder/elbow function after stroke have been poorly understood. The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between neuroplastic brain changes related to shoulder/elbow movement control in response to treatment and recovery of arm motor function in chronic stroke survivors.Methods: Twenty-three chronic stroke survivors were treated with 12 weeks of arm rehabilitation. Outcome measures included functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) for the shoulder/elbow components of reach and a skilled motor function test (Arm (...) Motor Abilities Test, AMAT), collected before and after treatment.Results: We observed two patterns of neuroplastic changes that were associated with gains in motor function: decreased or increased task-related brain activation. Those with significantly better motor function at baseline exhibited a decrease in brain activation in response to treatment, evident in the ipsilesional primary motor and contralesional supplementary motor regions; in contrast, those with greater baseline motor impairment, exhibited increased brain activation in response to treatment. There was a linear relationship between greater functional gain (AMAT) and increased activation in bilateral primary motor, contralesional primary and secondary sensory regions, and contralesional lateral premotor area, after adjusting for baseline AMAT, age, and time since stroke.Conclusions: Recovery of functional reach involves recruitment of several contralesional and bilateral primary motor regions. In response to intensive therapy, the direction of functional brain change (i.e., increase or decrease in task-related brain recruitment) for shoulder/elbow reach components depends on baseline level of motor function and may represent either different phases of recovery or different patterns of neuroplasticity that drive functional recovery. (shrink)

In this astonishingly rich volume, experts in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political theory, aesthetics, history, critical theory, and hermeneutics bring to light the best philosophical scholarship on what is arguably Nietzsche's most rewarding but most challenging text. Including essays that were commissioned specifically for the volume as well as essays revised and edited by their authors, this collection showcases definitive works that have shaped Nietzsche studies alongside new works of interest to students and experts alike. A lengthy introduction, annotated (...) bibliography, and index make this an extremely useful guide for the classroom and advanced research. (shrink)

This symposia-papers volume is the second volume of essays from the PSA 2008 program. The vast majority of the work in putting together this volume fell to the program committee. The members of this committee began the adjudication process with over 200 submitted papers and went through two rounds of selection, first for the program and then for this volume. Throughout, they all worked diligently and in good humor. So, I would like to thank Ken Aizawa, Rachel Ankeny, Davis Baird, (...) Paul Bartha, Anjan Chakravartty, Hasok Chang, Sharyn Clough, Carla Fehr, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Brad Monton, Mark Risjord, Laura Ruetsche, Kyle Stanford, Friedrich Steinle, and Peter Vranas. In addition to papers from symposia presented at PSA 2008, we hope the selection of symposia reveals the widening range of philosophical expertise within the PSA. (shrink)

Before he became a counterculture hero, Alan Watts was known as an incisive scholar of Eastern and Western psychology and philosophy. In this 1961 classic, Watts demonstrates his deep understanding of both Western psychotherapy and the Eastern spiritual philosophies of Buddhism, Taoism, Vedanta, and Yoga. He examined the problem of humans in a seemingly hostile universe in ways that questioned the social norms and illusions that bind and constrict modern humans. Marking a groundbreaking synthesis, Watts asserted that the powerful (...) insights of Freud and Jung, which had, indeed, brought psychiatry close to the edge of liberation, could, if melded with the hitherto secret wisdom of the Eastern traditions, free people from their battles with the self. When psychotherapy merely helps us adjust to social norms, Watts argued, it falls short of true liberation, while Eastern philosophy seeks our natural relation to the cosmos. (shrink)

This contributed-papers volume is the first volume of essays from the PSA 2008 program. The vast majority of the work in putting together this volume fell to the program committee. The members of this committee began the adjudication process with over 200 submitted papers and went through two rounds of selection, first for the program and then for this volume. Throughout, they all worked diligently and in good humor. So, I would like to thank Ken Aizawa, Rachel Ankeny, Davis Baird, (...) Paul Bartha, Anjan Chakravartty, Hasok Chang, Sharyn Clough, Carla Fehr, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Brad Monton, Mark Risjord, Laura Ruetsche, Kyle Stanford, Friedrich Steinle, and Peter Vranas. (shrink)

Bridging the gap between the world of science and the realm of the spiritual, B. Alan Wallace introduces a natural theory of human consciousness that has its roots in contemporary physics and Buddhism. Wallace's "special theory of ontological relativity" suggests that mental phenomena are _conditioned_ by the brain, but do not _emerge_ from it. Rather, the entire natural world of mind and matter, subjects and objects, arises from a unitary dimension of reality that is more fundamental than these dualities, (...) as proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung. To test his hypothesis, Wallace employs the Buddhist meditative practice of _samatha_, refining one's attention and metacognition, to create a kind of telescope to examine the space of the mind. Drawing on the work of the physicist John Wheeler, he then proposes a more general theory in which the participatory nature of reality is envisioned as a self-excited circuit. In comparing these ideas to the Buddhist theory known as the Middle Way philosophy, Wallace explores further aspects of his "general theory of ontological relativity," which can be investigated by means of _vipasyana_, or insight, meditation. Wallace then focuses on the theme of symmetry in reference to quantum cosmology and the "problem of frozen time," relating these issues to the theory and practices of the Great Perfection school of Tibetan Buddhism. He concludes with a discussion of the general theme of complementarity as it relates to science and religion. The theories of relativity and quantum mechanics were major achievements in the physical sciences, and the theory of evolution has had an equally deep impact on the life sciences. However, rigorous scientific methods do not yet exist to observe mental phenomena, and naturalism has its limits for shedding light on the workings of the mind. A pioneer of modern consciousness research, Wallace offers a practical and revolutionary method for exploring the mind that combines the keenest insights of contemporary physicists and philosophers with the time-honored meditative traditions of Buddhism. (shrink)

Bridging the gap between the world of science and the realm of the spiritual, B. Alan Wallace introduces a natural theory of human consciousness that has its roots in contemporary physics and Buddhism. Wallace's "special theory of ontological relativity" suggests that mental phenomena are _conditioned_ by the brain, but do not _emerge_ from it. Rather, the entire natural world of mind and matter, subjects and objects, arises from a unitary dimension of reality that is more fundamental than these dualities, (...) as proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung. To test his hypothesis, Wallace employs the Buddhist meditative practice of _samatha_, refining one's attention and metacognition, to create a kind of telescope to examine the space of the mind. Drawing on the work of the physicist John Wheeler, he then proposes a more general theory in which the participatory nature of reality is envisioned as a self-excited circuit. In comparing these ideas to the Buddhist theory known as the Middle Way philosophy, Wallace explores further aspects of his "general theory of ontological relativity," which can be investigated by means of _vipasyana_, or insight, meditation. Wallace then focuses on the theme of symmetry in reference to quantum cosmology and the "problem of frozen time," relating these issues to the theory and practices of the Great Perfection school of Tibetan Buddhism. He concludes with a discussion of the general theme of complementarity as it relates to science and religion. The theories of relativity and quantum mechanics were major achievements in the physical sciences, and the theory of evolution has had an equally deep impact on the life sciences. However, rigorous scientific methods do not yet exist to observe mental phenomena, and naturalism has its limits for shedding light on the workings of the mind. A pioneer of modern consciousness research, Wallace offers a practical and revolutionary method for exploring the mind that combines the keenest insights of contemporary physicists and philosophers with the time-honored meditative traditions of Buddhism. (shrink)

In this paper I identify two problematic strands of Wilber's transpersonal theory. Firstly, I question Wilber's claim that his spectrum model is supported by the materials of all the world's major mystical traditions, arguing that his integral, hierarchical perspective privileges some traditions, while distorting others. Drawing heavily upon Andrew Rawlins on's recent, taxonomic study of mystical traditions, which identifies four authentic routes to spiritual emancipation (Cool Structured, Cool Unstructured, Hot Structured and Hot Unstructured), I argue that while Wilber's model, itself (...) Cool (the source of spiritual liberation hes within oneself) and Structured (developmental, hierarchical), provides a valuable cartography of transpersonal structures and states of consciousness, h cannot adequately handle the materials of the alternative, soteriological paths of Hot traditions (emphasising the numinous, and as other than oneself) and Unstructured traditions (affirming that there can be no gradual, or progressive, spiritual development at ah). Secondly, and more cursorily, in the light of this discussion, I argue that it is Wilber's Cool Structured perspective that informs his judgement that Jung is an elevationist. I demonstrate that Jung's psychic model of the conjunction of opposhes is a Hot Structured one, which provides an alternative, soteriological path for people whose spiritual needs are very different from those addressed by Wilber. (shrink)

The authors develop an axiomatic theory of nonexistent objects and and give a formal semantics for the language of the theory.

This article explores Nietzsche’s interest in perspectives. Various epistemological and semantic interpretations of perspectivism are considered, including readings of it as a semantic claim about the nature of truth, and readings of perspectivism as an epistemological claim, that all knowledge depends on interests or affect. Nietzsche’s perspectivism is best interpreted as a kind of psychobiological claim that serves as an extension of his claim that all life is will to power. On this reading, perspectivism has neither semantic significance nor epistemological (...) import. (shrink)

A centipede can walk until it thinks about howit does so. Thereafter it stumbles, over thesheer impossibility of the information andcoordination required. Life in the economy islittle different. Those engaged in productionand exchange discover, pragmatically, ways tomake them work. Those observing the processsee, realistically, the immense improbabilitythat it should do so. That most economies workin practice, but must pass such toughteleological tests to succeed in theory,highlights a difference between players' andspectators' outlook which may help to explainwhy the game has repeatedly (...) been thrown wideopen just when conclusive results seemed withinreach.Section 1 of this paper identifies the fourforms of realism which economists have tendedto adopt. Section 2 considers the pragmatism ofeconomic agents, when observed in action bypsychologists and management scholars notoverly steeped in economic theory. Theconcluding section reviews the ways in whicheconomists have tried to blur the distinction,by reclassifying agents as realistic or theirown views as pragmatic, and suggests that amore pragmatic economics might bridge thedivide. (shrink)

David Brink, in his book Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, and other writers, have recently offered powerful new arguments for a form of moral realism that sees moral inquiry as being "on par" with scientific inquiry in many important epistemological and metaphysical respects. I call this theory "Assimilative Moral Realism" . AMR is marked by naturalism about moral facts, and by empiricism about moral knowledge. Moral facts are held to be facts about properties that are constituted by, and (...) supervene upon, complexes of ordinary natural and social properties, just as certain scientific facts are facts about the macrophysical properties that are realized by certain microphysical bases. Moral beliefs are held to be justifiable in the way certain scientific beliefs ostensibly are: via certain explanatory inferences and indirect empirical tests of moral principles. Further, traditional semantical objections to naturalistic moral realism can be avoided, it is supposed, because semantical tests for the existence of moral facts can plausibly be rejected, just as they can be in the scientific case. In this thesis, I make a case for rejecting this assimilative theory. I provide a number of technical reasons to suppose that moral principles cannot be tested empirically using the Duhemian method advocated by AMR theorists. I also give a critique of their main arguments for the relevance and indispensability of assumptions about moral facts to explanations of moral judgments and other items, and conclude that their arguments establish neither the explanatory relevance nor necessity of moral assumptions. Finally, in place of the AMR theory of supervening moral properties, I offer an account of moral supervenience claims--an account that is itself compatible with AMR only if there are sound moral explanations of certain nonmoral facts. (shrink)

Wilber's most timely, accessible, and practical work to date. Here is a concise, comprehensive overview of Wilber's revolutionary thought and its application in today's world. Wilber has long been hailed as one of the most important thinkers of our time, but--until now--his work has seemed inaccessible to the general reader who lacks a background in consciousness studies or evolutionary theory. Integral Vision will allow a general audience to fully understand what all the excitement has been about. In clear, non-technical language, (...) Wilber presents complex, cutting-edge theories and models that integrate the realms of body, mind, soul, and spirit. He then demonstrates how these theories and models can be applied to real world problems. Finally, Wilber discusses daily practices that readers take up in order to apply this integrative vision to their own, everyday lives. Wilber begins by presenting a leading model of human evolution, a model called "spiral dynamics." He then goes on to summarize his ground-breaking "all-level, all-quadrant" model for integrating the seemingly contradictory realms of science and religion--the "all-level, all-quadrant" model has already been adopted by leading thinkers in a variety of fields. In a chapter entitle "The Real World," Wilber shows how these rather abstract theories and models are being applied to real-world issues such as politics, medicine, business, education, and the environment. Wilber goes on to present a collection of maps of the Kosmos. These are broader models that can integrate the various worldviews that have been developed around the world throughout the ages. The final chapter of the book, "One Taste," proposes that readers take up an "integral transformative practice" such as meditation to help them to apply and develop this integral vision in their personal, everyday lives. (shrink)

Nietzsche never presented a worked-out normative ethical theory and appeared to regard any attempt to do so as woefully misguided. He poured scorn on the main contenders for such a theory in his day, and in ours – Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. Moreover, he repeatedly referred to himself as an 'immoralist' and gave one of his books the title Beyond Good and Evil, thus seeming only to confirm the impression that he was more interested in demolishing, and even abolishing morality (...) altogether than in making any constructive contribution to the subject. While the topic of morality appears as a central and almost obsessive interest in his works – especially in the sequence of books from Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality (1881) to On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) – it generally does so as the target of relentless criticism. Many have concluded, not surprisingly, that Nietzsche, rather than being interested in replacing an existing conception of morality with a better one of his own, was in the business of advising us to abandon morality altogether – to live, in some sense, without morality. (shrink)

Molinism is named after Luis de Molina (1535–1600). Molina and his fellow Jesuits became entangled in a fierce debate over issues involving the doctrine of divine providence, which is a picture of how God runs the world. Molinism reemerged in the 1970s after Alvin Plantinga unwittingly assumed it in his Free Will Defense against the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil. Molinism has been the subject of vigorous debate in analytic philosophy of religion ever since. The main aim of this essay is (...) to survey the main contours of this debate. We will visit some ‘old’ battlefields and current hot spots in the ongoing Molinism Wars. (shrink)

The desire to minimize the number of individual new entities postulated is often referred to as quantitative parsimony. Its influence on the default hypotheses formulated by scientists seems undeniable. I argue that there is a wide class of cases for which the preference for quantitatively parsimonious hypotheses is demonstrably rational. The justification, in a nutshell, is that such hypotheses have greater explanatory power than less parsimonious alternatives. My analysis is restricted to a class of cases I shall refer to as (...) additive. Such cases involve the postulation of a collection of qualitatively identical individual objects which collectively explain some particular observed phenomenon. Especially clear examples of this sort occur in particle physics. 1 Introduction 2 Particle physics: a case study 3 Three kinds of simplicity 4 Explanatory power 5 Explanation and non-observation 6 Parsimony and scientific methodology 7 Conclusions. (shrink)

In his paper, "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended version of hypothetico-deductivism, (H-D * ). In this discussion note it is shown that (H-D * ) has the consequence that "A is a non-black raven" confirms "All ravens are black" relative to any tautology! It is noted that Horwich's (H-D * ) bears a strong resemblance to Hempel's prediction criterion of confirmation and that the prediction criterion faces the same obstacle. A related problem for hypothetico-deductivism in its (...) simplest form--that is, E confirms H iff E is an (observational) consequence of H--is displayed. The discussion concludes with a suggestion about how (H-D * ) and simple hypothetico-deductivism might be amended in order to avoid these results. (shrink)

It's hard to say exactly when modern science began. Many scholars would date it at roughly 1600, when both Kepler and Galileo started using precision measurement to map the universe. But one thing is certain: starting from whatever date we choose, modern science was, in many important ways and right from the start, deeply antagonistic to established religion.

In this book Wilber presents a model of consciousness that encompasses empirical, psychological, and spiritual modes of understanding. Wilber examines three realms of knowledge: the empirical realm of the senses, the rational realm of the mind, and the contemplative realm of the spirit. Eye to Eye points the way to a broader, more inclusive understanding of ourselves and the universe.

A new, easy-to-grasp map of human consciousness against which the various therapies from both Western and Eastern sources are introduced. Designed to help individuals understand the practice of each therapy.

Despite immediate appearances, this book is not primarily a hermeneutical exercise in which the superiority of one interpretation of canonical texts is championed against others. Its origin lies elsewhere, near the overlap of history, psychoanalysis, aesthetics, and social theory of the usual kind. Weber, Pareto, Freud, W. I. Thomas, Max Scheler, Karl Mannheim, and many others of similar stature long ago wondered and wrote much about the interplay between societal rationalization and individual rationality, between collective furor and private psychopathology—in short, (...) about the strange and worrisome union of “character and social structure” (to recall Gerth and Mills). Pondering the history of social thought in this century can lead to the unpleasant realization that such large-scale questions slipped away, especially from sociologists, sometime before World War II. Or, if not entirely lost, they were so transformed in range and rhetoric that a gap opened between contemporary theorizing and its European background. Perhaps this partly explains Weber’s continuing appeal. By dealing with him, one might again broach topics long at odds with “social science” of the last forty years.—From the Preface. (shrink)

Book synopsis: This astonishingly rich volume collects the work of an international group of scholars, including some of the best known in academia. Experts in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political theory, aesthetics, history, critical theory, and hermeneutics bring to light the best philosophical scholarship what is arguably Friedrich Nietzsche's most rewarding but most challenging text. Including essays that were commissioned specifically for the volume as well as essays revised and edited by their authors, this collection showcases definitive works that (...) have shaped Nietzsche studies alongside new works of interest to students and experts alike. Sections are devoted to the topic of genealogy generally, numerous essays on specific passages, applications of genealogy in later thinkers, and the import of Nietzsche's Genealogy in contemporary politics, ethics, and aesthetics. A lengthy introduction, annotated bibliography, and index make this an extremely useful guide for the classroom and advanced research. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay argues that historians of science who seek to embody our oxymoronic self-description must confront both contradictory terms that define our common enterprise—that is, both “history” and “science.” On the history/methods side, it suggests that we embrace the heterogeneity of our institutional arrangements and repudiate the homogeneous disciplinary model sometimes advocated by Thomas Kuhn and followed by art history. This implies that rather than treating the history of science as an end in itself, we consider it a means (...) to a variety of historical ends, think of ourselves as a tool-making community, and jettison moralistic assertions of scientific exceptionalism. To do so, this essay argues—on the science/subject side—that we rebrand the subject of our historical inquiry as “episcience,” a neologism that stands in relation to “science” as the new field of epigenetics does to the old genetics. Episcience encompasses both the material activities of the relevant sciences and their “surround” (environment, milieu, Umgebung) to reframe knowledge making to include the material processes that put science “in play” and make its findings matter beyond science. The essay concludes that “the history of science” is an oxymoron that makes sense to the extent that its practitioners acknowledge that the history of science is important not just because science is important, but because its history is. (shrink)